Maintaining Technology Advantage

The DoW established a joint analysis capability, the Joint Acquisition Program and Exploitation Cell (JAPEC), to produce analytics products in support of the technology protection mission, such as for foreign investment screening; engage with acquisition, intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement sources to determine consequences of, and appropriate preventative/mitigation actions against unwanted technology transfer; and assess controlled unclassified technical information losses. JAPEC detects and characterizes past technology losses, conducts damage assessments of lost information, and provides insights with predictive value to support and promote activities. JAPEC enables comprehensive, detailed assessments of U.S. military technological vulnerability, as well as inform the development and application of effective policies, countermeasures, and enforcement actions to preserve U.S. technical superiority in all warfighting domains. JAPEC engages with select allies and partners to develop protection efforts across the extended supply chains resulting from the partnerships created by the global S&T community. JAPEC and supporting organizations synchronize, integrate, coordinate, and inform DoW efforts to protect critical technologies from malign investment by strategic competitors and to combat malign activities. JAPEC conducts trend analysis of protection efforts for the Department’s critical acquisition programs and technologies, incorporates findings into protection processes and activities, and analyzes losses, to determine consequences and appropriate courses of action, such as deterrence of our strategic competitors as well as promotion of the NSIB. JAPEC also manages OUSW(R&E)’s responsibilities for CFIUS, including the assessment, review, and investigation of transactions on the CFIUS docket, especially those pertaining to critical technology, sensitive personal data (such as genomic data), and the NSIB, as well as the identification of “non-notified” transactions that are not yet before CFIUS but which may raise national security concerns for OUSW(R&E) programs and mission space, meriting formal review.

As the Department develops advanced technologies, it must use a rigorous, repeatable methodology to protect technology advantage. For example, the Department will establish and implement procedures to protect critical technology in science and technology (S&T), encompassing the lifecycle of basic and applied research, advanced technology development, prototyping, and technology transition to programs. This includes driving consistency across risk-based security reviews for fundamental research and Small Businesses Innovation Research / Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) programs. This also include working with the acquisition community to identify Programs of Record and S&T Projects that require enhanced protection to maintain U.S. technological advantage. The production, updating, and use of Technology Area Protection Plans (TAPPs) generate consistent protection of critical technology, provide foundational guidance for communicating about the technology to particular audiences, and inform protection and controls integrated with technology promotion activities. The implementation of the guidance and TAPPs have broad impacts across DoW and interagency-wide activities associated with critical technologies, including development of protection practices with DoW research performers (e.g., the DoW and national laboratories, academia, small businesses, and the broader industrial innovation base); international agreements; counterintelligence and law enforcement priorities and activities; export controls; and foreign investment screening through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

The Department of War (DoW) must address System Security Engineering risk, including cyber resilience, cybersecurity, and supply chain risks to DoW networks, weapon systems, and information stored and processed on both the DoW and the War Industrial Base (DIB) unclassified contractor information networks that The Department of War (DoW) must address System Security Engineering risk, including cyber resilience, cybersecurity, and supply chain risks to DoW networks, weapon systems, and information stored and processed on both the DoW and the War Industrial Base (DIB) unclassified contractor information networks that support DoW programs. Advanced persistent threats (APTs) that can evade commercially available security tools and defeat generic security best practices, drives the need for diligent program protection planning and execution. This project supports implementation of DoDI 5000.83, Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage. Activities carried out for Program Protection Planning include providing Program Protection Plan (PPP) review and oversight for Acquisition Category 1D Acquisition Programs and providing guidance to ensure consistency and comprehensive protection of the acquisition program. Program protection planning must address protection of controlled technical information, critical program information, critical components and critical mission functions; and integration of system security policies and acquisition and S&T practices, secure cyber resilient engineering activities, and system security risk reduction activities. This initiative is developing new and maturing existing system security engineering methodologies and capabilities to advance DoW Programs’ ability to protect critical information, functions, and components. This initiative is supporting the education and training of system security and program protection acquisition professionals through the establishment and course development of War Acquisition Credentials.